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Mechanism design for resource allocation in
networks with intergroup competition and
intragroup sharing
Abhinav Sinha, Student Member, IEEE and Achilleas Anastasopoulos, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—We consider a network where strategic agents, who
are contesting for allocation of resources, are divided into fixed
groups. The network control protocol is such that within each
group agents get to share the resource and across groups
they contest for it. A prototypical example is the allocation of
data rate on a network with multicast/multirate architecture.
Compared to the unicast architecture (which is a special case),
the multicast/multirate architecture can result in substantial
bandwidth savings. However, design of a market mechanism in
such a scenario requires dealing with both private and public
good problems as opposed to just private goods in unicast.
The mechanism proposed in this work ensures that social
welfare maximizing allocation on such a network is realized at all
Nash equilibria (NE) i.e., full implementation in NE. In addition
it is individually rational, i.e., agents have an incentive to partic-
ipate in the mechanism. The mechanism, which is constructed in
a quasi-systematic way starting from the dual of the centralized
problem, has a number of useful properties. Specifically, due to a
novel allocation scheme, namely “radial projection”, the proposed
mechanism results in feasible allocation even off equilibrium. This
is a practical necessity for any realistic mechanism since agents
have to “learn” the NE through a dynamic process. Finally, it is
shown how strong budget balance at equilibrium can be achieved
with a minimal increase in message space as an add-on to a
weakly budget balanced mechanism.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
Design of mechanisms that fully implement Walrasian and
Lindahl allocations in Nash equilibrium (NE) have been
extensively studied in the literature, e.g. [1]–[6]. These two
ubiquitous examples present two different aspects in market
design - private and public goods, respectively. Recently, gener-
alizing the original contributions described above, a number of
works addressed the problem of full implementation in NE of
social utility maximization under linear inequality constraints
[7]–[12]. In the area of computer/communication networks,
the prototypical example of this problem is the allocation of
rate (bandwidth) in a “unicast” network architecture on the
Internet, as depicted in Fig. 1. In this context, an agent is a
receiver (e.g., {Ri}i=1,2,3,4 in Fig. 1), who communicates with
his respective transmitter via a fixed route consisting of links
(e.g., R2 communicates with T1 via the route consisting of
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the T1-A, A-B, B-C, C-R2 links, whereas R3 communicates
with T2 via the T2-A, A-B, B-C, C-R3 links). The scenario
depicted in Fig. 1 is such that receivers R1, R2 request the
same data (e.g., the same movie), which is transmitted by
transmitter T1. Similarly R3, R4 request the same data which
is transmitted by transmitter T2. The term “unicast” refers to
the fact that the network establishes separate connections for
each agent in each link (even when agents communicate the
same content), and thus each agent loads each link with the
amount of bandwidth it is allocated. The inequality constraints
quantify the capacity constraints at each link (e.g., in link A-B,
x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 ≤ cAB , where cAB is the capacity of link
A-B and xi’s are the allocated rates for the four agents sharing
this link). Thus the unicast problem is a pure private goods
problem with one good (i.e., rate) to be allocated and multiple
constraints on the same good (i.e., one capacity constraint per
link).
There are however a number of interesting problems in
economics and engineering that do not fit the above general
model, as they involve agents forming groups and entail
intergroup competition and intragroup sharing. We present this
class of problems in the context of communication networks
and in particular for the problem of rate allocation in a “mul-
ticast/multirate” architecture on the Internet, as depicted in
Fig. 2. The model considered in this paper is such that for each
receiver there is exactly one transmitter who communicates
with it, whereas for each transmitter there can be multiple
2receivers who communicate with it. Similarly to the unicast
scenario, an agent is a receiver. Agents form multicast groups
based on the content they communicate (e.g., {R1, R2} form
a group and so do agents {R3, R4}). At the same time, agents
within a group may request different bandwidth for the same
content, where this differentiation is due to different quality
of service requested by the users within a group, such as in
high- vs standard-definition video. In the multicast protocol,
in each link only a single connection is established for each
multicast group carrying the corresponding content at the
highest requested rate. This is motivated by the fact that any
lower-quality content can always be derived from the higher-
quality content and thus there is no need to further load the link
other than with the highest rate (e.g., agents R1, R2, R3, R4
all communicate via link A-B, but only two distinct contents
are transmitted on it, resulting in a capacity constraint of the
form max{x1, x2} + max{x3, x4} ≤ cAB). Such a unique
architecture makes the multicast/multirate allocation problem
qualitatively different from the unicast since there is sharing
of bandwidth as well as competition for it.
A second motivating scenario comes from the provision of
data-security on server farms. Consider multiple server farms,
each hosting data for several companies. Data security at
each server farm is provided by simultaneous use of different
security products out of a set L of possible products. Due
to different companies having different security needs, for
any company i in server farm k achieving security level
xki requires a profile {αlkixki}l∈L of quantities of different
security products1, where αlki are positive constants denoting
the effectiveness of product l for company i on server farm
k. However, since at each server farm the effectiveness of the
security product is not additive, the quantity of any security
product required at a server farm is dictated only by the
maximum quantity/quality of that security product demanded
amongst companies in that farm. Finally, allocation of security
products among server farms is constrained by the limited
quantity of each security product being available.
Looking at the structure of both these problems, one sees
both a private and a public goods aspect of market design in
them. Referring to the multicast problem, due to the capacity
constraints on the links of the network, allocation of rate for
one content implies that such rate cannot be allocated to agents
sharing this link, who have requested a different content - this
is the private good aspect resulting in intergroup competition.
On the other hand for agents requesting the same content,
since the allocation via the capacity constraint is dictated only
by the highest rate from that group, others in the group can
be allocated additional rate (up to the maximum requested
in that group on that link) without having to affect anybody
else’s allocation - this is the public goods aspect resulting in
intragroup sharing and the inevitable “free-rider” problem [13,
sec. 11.C], albeit in a problem where consumption is still
private.
1The final security level can be thought of as being achieved by use of
different security products via a Leontief-like production function [13, p. 49].
B. Contributions
The goal of this paper is to design appropriate incentives,
through allocation and taxes, such that when acting strate-
gically i.e. at NE, the corresponding allocation to agents is
efficient. This efficient allocation is the solution to a convex
optimization problem: maximization of sum of agents’ utilities
subject to network multicast constraints. The taxes imposed
by the mechanism refer to actual money paid by agents
and not to virtual signals, as may be the case in works on
distributed optimization. Therefore our model assumes the
presence of an authority capable of collecting taxes from the
agents or disbursing subsidies to the agents (as dictated by the
mechanism).
For the problem of designing a mechanism that leads to
a single-shot game, the well-accepted measure of complexity
is the dimensionality of the message space of the proposed
mechanism. Similar to some of the works mentioned earlier,
the mechanism presented here requires agents to communicate
via announcing relatively “small” signals, which only consist
of demands and prices. However, contrary to some of the
earlier works in communications, such as [9], [14], [15],
the work here ensures full implementation of social welfare
maximizing allocation, so the designer can guarantee that only
the most efficient outcome will be reached and no other. This
is the first contribution of this work. Note that we avoid using
direct mechanisms (see [16], [17] for definition) since for this
problem agents’ private information is their utility function and
it would be impractical to ask agents to quote entire functions.
This also means that we do not use such terms as “incentive
compatibility” and “truth-telling” as they apply only to direct
mechanisms.
In addition to the stated goal of getting optimal allocations
at all Nash equilibria (NE) and ensuring individual rational-
ity (IR), the mechanism presented here has two auxiliary
properties. The first auxiliary property, and the second con-
tribution of this work, is to achieve feasibility on and off
equilibrium via a “radial projection” allocation function. This
property implies that the contract promises to allocate rates
to agents in such a way that the link capacity constraints are
never violated, contrary to the works in [8], [10], [18], [19].
While, clearly, feasibility is satisfied by definition at NE, the
proposed mechanism achieves it even off equilibrium. Off-
equilibrium feasibility has much deeper implications in the
context of networks as described below. The use of NE as
a solution concept in the implementation literature can lead
to problems in practice since calculation of NE requires full
information on part of the agents (which may not happen on
an informationally and physically decentralized system like the
Internet). Thus the justification for using NE (even for single
shot games) is that for certain classes of learning dynamics,
repeated play with the mechanism will ensure that the NE
is “learned” eventually. Since information capacity constraints
on a network are hard constraints and cannot be violated at
any cost (in the short run), the above “learning” justification
is applicable only when allocation is feasible throughout the
learning process. Hence off-equilibrium feasibility becomes
a necessity and the mechanism presented in this work is
3“learning ready” in that respect.
Regarding the specific technique used to achieve off-
equilibrium feasibility, radial projection refers to agents’ de-
mands being converted into allocations by scaling of the
overall demand vector to the boundary of the feasible region
defined by the capacity constraints. This allocation method
subsumes as a special case the allocation function introduced
in [7], [20] for communication on a single-link unicast net-
work, and for stochastic control of networks in [21] (readers
may be refer to [12] for a full implementation mechanism that
uses a similar allocation concept in the unicast problem).
The second auxiliary property of the proposed mechanism
and the final contribution of this work is to demonstrate how
strong budget balance (SBB) at NE can be added to the non-
budget balanced mechanism with the exchange of an extra
signal (see Section IV). This is in contrast to [18], where
significant effort has been made to ensure budget balance
off equilibrium for feasible allocations, while feasibility itself
isn’t ensured off equilibrium. With the proposed modification,
achieving SBB at NE becomes a relatively straightforward
task. This is to be contrasted with the mechanisms proposed
in [14], [15] where SBB becomes a very difficult property to
guarantee.
C. Relevant literature
The earliest unicast mechanisms were inspired by the semi-
nal work [21], which presents a mechanism with competitive
equilibrium as the solution concept. Mechanism design work
for unicast network include [7], [9], [20], [22], [23], and
specifically, Nash implementation for general unicast has been
studied in [8], [10], [12]. In all the above works, the network
structure is assumed to be fixed; alternately [24] studies the
relay problem where agents own links and can price the data
going through them.
Mechanism design has also been studied for power al-
location problems in wireless networks. These are public
goods problems, since the quality of service achieved by any
agent depends not only on his signal strength but also that
of neighboring agents due to interference from surrounding
transmissions (see [19], [25], [26]).
Readers may refer to [27], [28] for mechanisms designed
to fully implement Walrasian and Lindahl allocations that are
guaranteed to converge to the NE with a large class of learning
dynamics. Both [27], [28] rely on the off-equilibrium proper-
ties - specifically that of the best response correspondence -
to ensure a “learning” property in their mechanism. Authors
in [11] ensure that their mechanism induces a best response
correspondence that has a partial truth-telling property: the
allocation and price (xi, pi) quoted by agent i, in her best
response, are related to her utility vi(·) as pi = v′i(xi) (even
if xi isn’t equal to the optimal allocation x
∗
i ).
In multicast/multirate models without strategic agents, re-
searchers have argued for different optimality criteria. One ex-
ample is the max-min fairness for multicast used in [29]–[32].
On the other hand, the works in [33], [34] have used integer
and convex programming to get decentralized algorithms that
maximize the sum of utilities. Stoenescu et al [35] propose a
realization algorithm which converges to optimal allocation.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in
Section II, the centralized problem that we wish to implement
is stated and its solution is characterized. In Section III, the
mechanism is described and its properties are derived for the
weak budget balance (WBB) case. This mechanism is modified
in Section IV to include strong budget balance at NE. Section
V discusses the relevant literature and some salient features of
the mechanism.
II. CENTRALIZED PROBLEM
For concreteness, the exposition follows the prototypical
example of rate allocation in a multicast/multirate network
architecture on the Internet. The system consists of a set N
of Internet agents who communicate over a fixed multicast
network. Each agent here is considered as a pair of source
and destination users and the agents are divided into disjoint
multicast groups based on the content that they communicate.
The set of agents is described as N = {(k, i) | k ∈
K, i ∈ Gk}, where the set of multicast groups is denoted by
K = {1, 2, . . . ,K} and within a group k ∈ K, the set of
agents is denoted by Gk = {1, . . . , Gk}. We use the notation
ki instead of (k, i) to denote a generic agent.
We denote by xki ≥ 0 the rate allocated to an agent ki and
it refers to the data-rate that agent ki communicates with (with
the data content being the same as that of any other agent from
group k). Thus the overall allocation for the system is a vector
x = (xki)ki∈N of rates allocated to all the agents.
Agents’ have private valuation and thus for any agent ki, the
valuation for allocation xki is vki(xki) where vki(·) : R+ →
R.
The multicast network consists of links through which
agents’ data is transmitted from source to destination. The
route Lki of agent ki is the set of links that agent ki uses
for his communication, and L = ∪ki∈NLki is the set of all
available links. We denote by N l the set of agents utilizing a
link l ∈ L and it is defined as N l = {ki ∈ N | l ∈ Lki}.
Also we define Glk ⊆ Gk to be the set of agents from group
k who use link l and Kl to be the set of groups that have at
least one agent that uses link l i.e. Kl = {k ∈ K | Glk 6= ∅}.
Finally, the cardinality of all the sets defined above are
denoted as follows N = |N |, K = |K|, Gk = |Gk|, L = |L|,
Lki = |Lki|, Glk = |G
l
k| and N
l = |N l|.
In addition to group-wise ordering of agents, we also
introduce a combined group and link-wise ordering of agents2.
For group k and link l, any agent ki, can be identified by the
index glk(i), where the mapping is defined as
ki 7→ glk(i) where 1 ≤ g
l
k(i) ≤ G
l
k, ∀ l ∈ Lki. (1)
The above mapping is defined so that it preserves the original
ordering i.e. ∀ i, j ∈ Glk and i > j we have g
l
k(i) > g
l
k(j).
Note that with this requirement the mapping is uniquely de-
fined. For instance, if group k has four agents {k1, k2, k3, k4}
and only agents k1, k3, k4 use a particular link l then
k1 7→ glk(1) = 1, k3 7→ g
l
k(3) = 2, k4 7→ g
l
k(4) = 3. (2)
2Given previous definitions, this reindexing is somewhat redundant; how-
ever, it will be used in the following to make the exposition clearer.
4The network administrator is interested in maximizing the
social welfare under the link capacity constraints. This central-
ized problem is
max
x
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Gk
vki(xki) (CP0)
s.t. xki ≥ 0 ∀ ki ∈ N (I1)
and
∑
k∈Kl
max
j∈Gl
k
{αlkjxkj} ≤ c
l ∀ l ∈ L. (I2)
Constraints I2 are the inequality constraints on allocation
and represent the capacity constraint for every link l ∈ L,
in the network. Here αlkj are constants that represent the
quality of service requirement of agent kj combined with the
specific architecture on link l. So in order for agent kj to
receive an actual data-rate of xkj the bandwidth spent on link
l is αlkjxkj . As an example, α
l
kj =
1
Rkj(1−ǫlkj)
for all links
l ∈ Lkj , where ǫlkj represents the packet error probability
for link l for a packet encoded with channel coding rate Rkj .
Observe that due to the multicast/multirate architecture, only
the maximum rate of each group k at each link l enters the
capacity constraints.
A. Assumptions
The analysis will be done under the following assumptions.
(A1) For all agents, vki(·) ∈ Vki, where the sets Vki are
arbitrary subsets of V0, the set of all strictly increasing,
strictly concave, twice differentiable functions R+ → R
with continuous second derivative.
(A2) v′ki(0) is finite ∀ ki ∈ N . This also implies that v
′
ki(x)
is finite and bounded ∀ ki and ∀ x ∈ R+ since vki’s are
concave.
(A3) Every link has at least two groups that use it i.e. K l ≥ 2
∀ l ∈ L.
(A4) The optimal solution of the centralized problem is such
that for every link there are at least 2 groups such that
each has at least one non-zero component, i.e. if Sl(x) :=
{k ∈ Kl | ∃ i ∈ Glk s.t. xki > 0} then the assumption
says |Sl(x∗)| ≥ 2 ∀ l ∈ L (where x∗ is the optimal
solution of (CP0)).
In addition, the coefficients are all strictly positive, i.e. αlki > 0
∀ l ∈ Lki, ∀ ki ∈ N . Also, for well-posedness of the problem
we take cl > 0 ∀ l ∈ L.
Assumption (A1) is made in order for the centralized prob-
lem to have a unique solution at the boundary of the feasible
region and for this solution to be precisely characterized by
the KKT conditions. (A2) is a mild technical assumption
that is required in the proof of Lemma III.7. Assumption
(A3) is made in order to avoid situations where there is a
link/constraint involving only one multicast group. Such a
case requires special handling in the design of the mechanism
(since in such a case there is no contention at that link), and
destructs from the basic idea that we want to communicate.
Finally (A4) is related to (A3) and is made in order to simplify
the exposition of the proposed mechanism, without having to
define corner cases that are of minor importance. One can
state a number of mild sufficient conditions on the original
optimization problem (CP0) such that (A4) is satisfied. For
instance if the optimal solution x∗ =
(
x∗ki
)
ki∈N
is such
that x∗ki > 0 for every agent ki then assumption (A4) is
satisfied. Furthermore, this can be ensured by considering
utility functions such that v′ki(0) is sufficiently large.
B. Necessary and Sufficient Optimality conditions
Under the stated assumptions, (CP0) is a convex optimiza-
tion problem. Following are the necessary KKT conditions
for optimality, which under the stated assumptions are also
sufficient (due to the strict concavity of vki(·)). For this the
centralized problem is first rewritten by restating the capacity
constraints in a different form
max
x,m
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Gk
vki(xki) (CP)
s.t. xki ≥ 0 ∀ ki ∈ N (C1)
and
∑
k∈Kl
mlk ≤ c
l ∀ l ∈ L (C2)
and αlkixki ≤ m
l
k ∀ i ∈ G
l
k, k ∈ K
l, l ∈ L. (C3)
The capacity constraints have been rewritten with the introduc-
tion of new variables. The virtual variablesmlk ∈ R+ represent
the weighted maximum requirement of group k on link l.
It’s easy to see that the solution of (CP) is the same as the
solution of the original (CP0) as far as optimal x is concerned.
We introduce λ, µ, ν as the dual variables corresponding to
constraints C2, C3 and C1, respectively. The KKT conditions
are stated without explicitly referring to νki’s and just using
the fact that ν∗ki ≥ 0 and ν
∗
kix
∗
ki = 0 ∀ ki ∈ N . Note that
with the assumptions above, the KKT conditions below will
give rise to a unique x∗ as the optimizer for (CP).
KKT conditions:
a) Primal Feasibility:
x∗ki ≥ 0 ∀ ki ∈ N (3a)∑
k∈Kl
mlk
∗
≤ cl ∀ l ∈ L; (3b)
αlkix
∗
ki ≤ m
l
k
∗
∀ i ∈ Glk, k ∈ K
l, l ∈ L. (3c)
b) Dual Feasibility: λ∗l ≥ 0 ∀ l ∈ L; µ
l
ki ≥ 0 ∀ ki ∈ N
l,
l ∈ L.
c) Complimentary Slackness:
λ∗l
∑
k∈Kl
mlk
∗
− cl
 = 0 ∀ l ∈ L, (4a)
µlki
∗
(
αlkix
∗
ki −m
l
k
∗
)
= 0 ∀ i ∈ Glk, k ∈ K
l, l ∈ L.
(4b)
d) Stationarity:
v′ki(x
∗
ki) =
∑
l∈Lki
µlki
∗
αlki ∀ ki ∈ N if x
∗
ki > 0 (5a)
v′ki(x
∗
ki) ≤
∑
l∈Lki
µlki
∗
αlki ∀ ki ∈ N if x
∗
ki = 0 (5b)
5and
λ∗l =
∑
i∈Gl
k
µlki
∗
∀ k ∈ Kl, l ∈ L. (6)
Looking at (4b), µlki
∗
will be non-zero only if αlkix
∗
ki = m
l
k
∗
,
so each µlki
∗
can be interpreted as the “price” paid only by
those agents who receive maximum weighted allocation in
group k at a given link l. Consequently, from (6), λ∗l is the
sum of µlki
∗
over those agents in group k that get maximum
allocation within the group and it is the same for all groups.
λ∗l can then be interpreted as the common total price per unit
of rate that each group is subject to at link l.
III. A MECHANISM WITH WEAK BUDGET BALANCE
In this section, we consider the case of weak budget
balance, i.e., the taxes tki of all agents at equilibrium satisfy∑
ki∈N tki ≥ 0. Note that the taxes used in the model refer to
actual money paid by agents and not virtual signals, as may
be the case in other works on distributed optimization.
A. Mechanism
The designer designs and announces the message space
Ski for each agent ki ∈ N . The agents pick their mes-
sage simultaneously and broadcast it. Based on the message
profile received s = (ski)ki∈N , the designer allocates rate
x = (xki)ki∈N as xki = h
x
ki(s). Similarly, the designer levies
a tax (or subsidy) on each agent t = (tki)ki∈N as tki = h
t
ki(s).
The proposed mechanism is described below by defining the
sets Ski and functions (hxki(·), h
t
ki(·)), for each ki ∈ N .
This gives rise to a one-shot game
G =
(
N ,
(
Ski
)
ki∈N
,
(
ûki(·)
)
ki∈N
)
, (7)
played by all the agents in N , where action sets are (Ski)ki∈N
and utilities are given by
ûki(s) = vki(xki)− tki = vki(h
x
ki(s))− h
t
ki(s) ∀ ki ∈ N .
(8)
The resource allocation problem (CP) would be fully imple-
mented in NE, if the outcomes (all possible NE) of this
game produce allocation x∗ and all agents in N are better-
off participating in the mechanism than opting out (getting 0
allocation and taxes).
Message Space. The designer asks each agent to report
a message ski = (yki, Qki) where Qki =
(
1Qki,
2Qki
)
with 1Qki =
(
1qlki
)
l∈Lki
and 2Qki =
(
2qlki
)
l∈Lki
; also
for convenience denote qlki =
(
1qlki,
2qlki
)
. The message ski
includes a proxy for agent ki’s demand for the rate, yki ∈ R+,
and two “prices” 1qlki ∈ R+,
2qlki ∈ R+ for each link l ∈ Lki
that agent ki is involved in. For each agent ki and each link l,
the first price 1qlki relates to the constraint α
l
kixki ≤ m
l
k, while
the second price 2qlki relates to the constraint α
l
kjxkj ≤ m
l
k,
where kj is the agent from group k on link l which can be
identified by the index glk(i) + 1 (see the group and link-
wise indexing notation defined in (1)). As it turns out, our
methodology makes quoting two prices necessary, as will be
shown later. An intuitive explanation for the need of two
prices is provided in the Discussion paragraphs after the tax
definition in (13) and (14). From the above definitions, the
message space for agent ki is Ski = R+×R
2Lki
+ . For received
messages s = (ski)ki∈N = (y,Q) = ((yki)ki∈N , (Qki)ki∈N )
the contract hki(s) = (h
x
ki(s), h
t
ki(s)) has an allocation
component hxki(·) and a tax component
3 htki(·) and is defined
for each ki ∈ N as follows.
Allocation function. If the received demand vector is
y = (y11, . . . , yKGK ) = 0 then the allocation is x =
(x11, . . . , xKGK ) = 0 (also set m = 0). Otherwise it is
evaluated by radially projecting the demand vector y on the
boundary of the feasibility region as depicted in Fig. 3 for
a two-group single-link case. More formally, the allocation
x11
x12
x21
x
y
Fig. 3. Radial projection allocation for a single-link multicast/multirate
network with 2 multicast groups K = {1, 2} with a total of 3 agents i.e.
N = {11, 12, 21}. Capacity constraint is max{x11, x12} + x21 ≤ 1. For
demand y allocation x is just the projection of y onto the feasible set boundary
(first sub-case of (9c) applies here).
function hxki(s) creates allocation by first creating proxies
nlk ∈ R+ for the weighted maximum at each link for each
group as follows
nlk , max
i∈Gl
k
{αlkiyki} ∀ k ∈ K
l, l ∈ L. (9a)
Then intermediate variables mlk’s are created by dilat-
ing/shrinking nlk’s on to one of the hyperplanes defined by the
second set of constraints in C2, specifically, that hyperplane
for which the corresponding mlk’s are the closest to origin
(this could also be at the intersection of multiple hyperplanes).
This is done through the introduction of a scaling factor r as
follows
r = min
l∈L
rl (9b)
rl =

cl∑
k∈Kl
nl
k
, if |Sl(y)| ≥ 2
cl∑
k∈Kl
nl
k
− f l(nlk), if S
l(y) = {k}
+∞ if |Sl(y)| = 0
(9c)
3All utilities in this work are assumed to be quasi-linear.
6f l(nlk) =
cl
nlk(n
l
k + 1)
. (9d)
Finally allocation xki is calculated by dilating/shrinking yki
by the same factor.
hxki(s) = xki = r yki ∀ ki ∈ N , (10a)
mlk , r n
l
k, ∀ k ∈ K
l, l ∈ L. (10b)
In other words, the contract dilates/shrinks nlk to the boundary
of the feasible region defined by the capacity constraints and
then allocations within a group are made proportionally. Since
all the αlkj’s are positive, this means that all constraints in C2
are satisfied for the allocation automatically, as shown later. In
the above description of the allocation function, the separate
definition for rl when |Sl(y)| < 2 is to ensure (as it will be
shown later) that there are no equilibria with allocation x∗,
where |Sl(x∗)| < 2.
Tax function. For the taxes, we first define total prices,
wlk, w¯
l
−k for any link l and group k ∈ K
l as
wlk ,
∑
i∈Gl
k
1qlki, w¯
l
−k ,
1
K l − 1
∑
k′∈Kl\{k}
wlk′ (11)
where w¯l−k is well-defined due to assumption (A3). The tax is
defined as the sum of taxes for each constraint in an agent’s
route
htki(s) = tki =
∑
l∈Lki
tlki ∀ ki ∈ N , (12)
and each component tlki is defined as follows. If G
l
k ≥ 2 then
consider agents kj and ke from group k and on link l who
can be identified by the index glk(i) − 1 and g
l
k(i) + 1 (mod
Glk), respectively. Then,
tlki = xkiα
l
ki
2qlkj + (
2qlki −
1qlke)
2 + (wlk − w¯
l
−k)
2
+ η 2qlkj(
1qlki −
2qlkj)(m
l
k − α
l
kixki)
+ ξ w¯l−k(w
l
k − w¯
l
−k)(c
l −
∑
k′∈Kl
mlk′ ), (13)
where η, ξ are sufficiently small positive constants (whose
selection is outlined in the proof of Lemma III.7). If Glk = 1
then
tlki = xkiα
l
kiw¯
l
−k + (w
l
k − w¯
l
−k)
2
+ η w¯l−k(
1qlki − w¯
l
−k)(m
l
k − α
l
kixki)
+ ξ w¯l−k(w
l
k − w¯
l
−k)(c
l −
∑
k′∈Kl
mlk′ ). (14)
Discussion. The need for two prices is mainly a technical
necessity (an unavoidable corner case whenever an inequality
constraint involves only one user) and can be explained as
follows. When there is a constraint involving at least two
agents, then it suffices to ask each agent to quote a single
price for it. The price quoted by agent kj would be used is
used in two places in (13): it would determine the price paid
by agent ki in his first tax term (this way agent ki does not
control both his price and (indirectly) his allocation) and it
will also be used in the fourth term of agent’s kj taxes to
make sure the complementary slackness condition is satisfied.
Similarly for the price quoted by user ki. However, for the
problem at hand, constraints (C3) (α
l
kixki ≤ m
l
k) involve only
one agent, ki, per constraint. This changes things because this
quoted price cannot be used both in his first and fourth tax
terms! This necessitates that users quote two prices as follows.
We require agent ki, to quote a price 1qlki that will be used in
his fourth tax term to make sure the complementary slackness
condition is satisfied. Clearly we cannot use the same quoted
price for his first tax term (this would violate the condition that
the same agent cannot control both his price and quantity). So
we ask agent kj to quote a price 2qlkj that is paid by agent
ki (first term in tlki). These two prices,
2qlkj ,
1qlki (the second
price quoted by kj and the first price quoted by ki) are thus
used as a proxy for the same quantity: the optimal Lagrange
multiplier µlki
∗
corresponding to the constraint αlkixki ≤ m
l
k.
It should now be clear what the role of the other tax terms
is. The second and third terms (2qlki −
1qlke)
2, (wlk − w¯
l
−k)
2
are introduced to incentivize agents to quote same prices. For
instance, the term (2qlki −
1qlke)
2 drives agent ki to quote
2qlki such that it matches
1qlke - both are a proxy for the
optimal Lagrange multiplier µlke
∗
, as explained above (for
the kj, ki pair of agents). Similarly, the purpose of the term
(wlk − w¯
l
−k)
2 is to tax every agent from group k additionally
(in a smooth manner) if the total group price wlk =
∑
i∈Gl
k
1qlki
doesn’t match with the average of group price w¯l−k for other
groups. This will drive agents to quote 1qlki’s such that the
two match and if the group price for all groups match with the
average of others, then indeed all group prices are the same
(as required by (6) in KKT). To satisfy the complimentary
slackness conditions at NE we introduce the fourth and fifth
terms which charge agent ki higher taxes if they quote non-
zero prices for inactive constraints. This necessarily requires
using an agent’s own quoted price (i.e. price 1qlki for agent
ki).
Finally, below we show that all tax terms except the first tax
term are zero at NE and 1qlki =
2qlkj = µ
l
ki
∗
, where µlki
∗
is the
optimal Lagrange multiplier (see (4b), (5a)). Consequently, the
total tax paid by agent ki at NE is tki = x
∗
ki
∑
l∈Lki
αlkiµ
l
ki
∗
=
x∗kiv
′
ki(x
∗
ki) (see (5a)). The price paid by agent ki at NE is
the true marginal valuation v′ki(x
∗
ki) of agent ki and thus the
mechanism ensures fairness of taxes paid by agents in the
sense that it they are exactly what expected in a free market.
Readers may refer to [2], [27] for mechanisms with small
message spaces which use similar technique for taxation in
Nash implementing mechanisms for Lindahl correspondence
(public goods).
There are two levels of interactions that this mechanism is
dealing with, one among groups for allocation of maximum
rate on each link and a second within each group. Agents
contest for allocation that makes full use of the fact that from
within a group only maximum at each link will give rise to
a positive price on that link. At any link l and group k, total
price wlk is the sum of prices quoted by all the agents in the
group at link l. The quantity w¯l−k is calculated by averaging
the total prices for link l over all other groups than k. Quoting
of prices and demand is used as a way of eliciting v′ki(xki)
7by comparing it appropriately with prices. In this vein, we
do not wish to influence w¯l−k with prices quoted by groups
whose agents aren’t using the link at all, since the price then
essentially doesn’t contain any information.
B. Results
The basic result of this section is summarized in the
following theorem.
Theorem III.1 (Full Implementation). For game G, there is a
unique allocation, x, corresponding to all NE. Moreover, x =
x∗, the maximizer of (CP). In addition, individual rationality
is satisfied for all agents and so is weak budget balance.
The theorem is proved by a sequence of results, in which all
candidate NE of G are characterized by necessary conditions
until only one family of NE candidates is left. Subsequently,
the existence of NE in pure strategies for G is shown, and
that all NE result in allocation x = x∗. Finally, individual
rationality and WBB will be checked.
Lemma III.2 (Primal Feasibility). For any action profile s =
(y,Q) of game G, constraints C1, C2 and C3 of (CP) are
satisfied at the corresponding allocation.
Proof. Please see Appendix A.
Feasibility of allocation for action profiles is a direct conse-
quence of the radial projection allocation function. Next, it is
shown that all groups, using a link, quote the same total price
wlk for that link at any equilibrium. This is brought about by
the 3rd tax term
∑
l(w
l
k− w¯
l
−k)
2. This is a way of threatening
agents with higher taxes just for quoting a different price than
average, at each link.
Lemma III.3. At any NE s = (y,Q) of G, for any link l ∈ L
we have
wlk = w
l ∀ k ∈ Kl. (15)
Also, for any group k and link l such that Glk ≥ 2 if we take
any agents i, e ∈ Glk where agent ke can be identified by the
index glk(i) + 1 then at equilibrium we will have
2qlki =
1qlke
(which will be denoted as plke).
Proof. Please see Appendix B.
With Lemma III.3, equilibria can now be referred to in
terms of the common total price vector P rather than the two
different total price vectors 1Q, and 2Q. In particular, any
NE s = (y,Q) with Q =
(
1Q, 2Q
)
can be characterized as
s = (y, P ) with P = (Pki)ki∈N and Pki =
(
plki
)
l∈Lki
.
Later it will become clear how plki and w
l take the place
of dual variables µlki and λl, respectively, when we compare
equilibrium conditions with KKT conditions, hence we iden-
tify the following condition as dual feasibility.
Lemma III.4 (Dual Feasibility). plki ≥ 0, w
l ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ Glk,
∀ k ∈ Kl and ∀ l ∈ L.
Proof. This is by design, since agents are only allowed to
quote non-negative prices and that wl is the sum of such prices.
Following is the property that solidifies the notion of
prices as dual variables, since the claim here is that inactive
constraints do not contribute to payment at equilibrium. This
notion is very similar to the centralized problem, where if we
know certain constraints to be inactive at the optimum then the
same problem without these constraints would be equivalent to
the original. The 4th and 5th terms in the tax function facilitate
this by charging extra taxes for inactive constraints where the
agent is quoting higher prices than the average of remaining
ones, thereby driving prices down.
Lemma III.5 (Complimentary Slackness). At any NE s =
(y, P ) of game G with corresponding allocation x, for any
agent i ∈ Glk, group k ∈ K
l and link l ∈ L we have
wl
∑
k∈Kl
mlk − c
l
 = 0, plki (αlkixki −mlk) = 0. (16)
Proof. Please see Appendix C.
Lemma III.6 (Stationarity). At any NE s = (y, P ) of game
G, and corresponding allocation x, we have
v′ki(xki) =
∑
l∈Lki
plkiα
l
ki ∀ ki ∈ N if xki > 0 (17a)
v′ki(xki) ≤
∑
l∈Lki
plkiα
l
ki ∀ ki ∈ N if xki = 0 (17b)
and
wl =
∑
i∈Gl
k
plki ∀ k ∈ K
l, l ∈ L. (18)
Proof. Please see Appendix D.
Collecting the results of the above lemmas, we can conclude
that every NE profile satisfies the KKT conditions of the (CP).
This means there are now necessary conditions on the NE up
to the point of having unique allocation (since KKT for (CP)
is satisfied by a unique optimal x). In the next Lemma we
verify the existence of the equilibria that we have claimed.
Lemma III.7 (Existence). For the game G, there exists an
equilibrium.
Proof. Please see Appendix E.
Several comments are in order regarding the selection of the
radial projection allocation function and in particular (9c). If
one uses “pure” radial projection i.e. same expression for rl for
|Sl(y)| ≥ 2 and ≤ 1, then irrespective of the optimal solution
of (CP), for game G the “stationarity” property will not be
satisfied at equilibria with |Sl(y)| ≤ 1. Thus the mechanism
will result in additional extraneous equilibria. This is the
reason why we tweak the expression for rl when |Sl(y)| ≤ 1,
so as to eliminate these extraneous equilibria - irrespective of
the solution of (CP). With this tweak in the expression for
rl, all KKT conditions become necessary for all equilibria
regardless of the value of |Sl(y)|. This however creates a
problem in the proof of existence of equilibria. In particular,
if x∗ was such that it had links where |Sl(x∗)| = 1 then with
modified radial projection allocation this would require y at
NE such that |Sl(y)| = 1. In this case the rl used would
8be lower than what the radial projection requires (see second
sub-case in (9c)) and we actually would have the problem of
possibly not having any y that creates x∗ as allocation. Hence
we have used (A4) to eliminate this case.
Lemma III.8 (Individual Rationality and WBB). At any NE
s = (y, P ) of G, with corresponding allocation x and taxes t,
we have
uki(x, t) ≥ uki(0, 0) ∀ ki ∈ N (19)
and
∑
ki∈N
tki ≥ 0. (20)
Proof. Please see Appendix F.
With all the Lemmas characterizing NE in the same way as
KKT conditions (and individual rationality), we can compare
them to prove Theorem III.1.
Proof of Theorem III.1. We know that the four KKT condi-
tions produce a unique solution x∗ (and corresponding λ∗). For
the game G, if NE exist, then from Lemmas III.2–III.6 we can
see that at any NE, allocation x and prices p satisfy the same
conditions as the four KKT conditions and hence they give a
unique x = x∗, as long as (A5) is satisfied. We conclude that
the allocation is x∗ across all NE. Existence of the claimed NE
is established in Lemma III.7. This combined with individual
rationality Lemma III.8, proves Theorem III.1.
IV. A MECHANISM WITH STRONG BUDGET BALANCE
We now present a modification of the previous mechanism
that in addition to previous results also ensures strong budget
balance (SBB) at NE i.e.
∑
ki∈N tki = 0.
For creating a mechanism in this formulation, the main
difference with the previous section, is that the designer has to
find a way of redistributing the total tax paid by all the agents.
In the last section it was shown that the total payment made
at the equilibrium is
B =
∑
ki∈N
(
xki
∑
l∈Lki
αlkip
l
ki
)
= r
∑
ki∈N
(
yki
∑
l∈Lki
αlkip
l
ki
)
,
(21)
since all other tax terms are zero at equilibrium. The method
here, following in the spirit of [2], is to redistribute taxes
by modifying the tax function for each agent only using
messages from other agents. This has the advantage of keeping
equilibrium calculations in line with the previous mechanism,
since deviations by an agent wouldn’t affect his utility through
this additional term. In view of this, an alternate expression
for B is
B = r
∑
ki∈N
∑
l∈Lki
1
N l − 1
∑
k′j∈N l\{ki}
αlk′jp
l
k′jyk′j
 ,
(22)
where each term of the outermost summation depends only
on demands of agents other than the kith one. This means
that each term in the parenthesis (scaled by the factor r) can
now be used as the desired additional tax for user ki. Observe
however that in our mechanism, each agent’s demand affects
the factor r as well. So, if all agents can agree on value of r
then that signal can be used to create the term that facilitates
budget balance.
In lieu of this, the mechanism here works by asking for
an additional signal ρki from every agent and imposing an
additional tax of (ρki − r)2, thereby essentially ensuring that
all agents agree on the value of r (via ρki’s) at equilibrium.
Finally, ρ¯−ki (see (26)) is used as a proxy for r in (22) -
somewhat similar to how w¯l−k’s were used in the third term
of (13).
A. Mechanism
The actions set for agent ki is now Ski = R+×R
2Lki
+ ×R+
where an action is of the form ski = (yki, Qki, ρki). The
allocation and tax function announced by the designer are
exactly as in the previous case, with the only exception that
the tax for any agent ki is now defined as
htki(s) = tki = ζ(ρki − r)
2 +
∑
l∈Lki
tlki. (23)
If Glk ≥ 2, then again using agents kj and ke as described
after (12), we have
tlki = xkiα
l
ki
2qlkj + (
2qlki −
1qlke)
2 + (wlk − w¯
l
−k)
2
+ η 2qlkj(
1qlki −
2qlkj)(m
l
k − α
l
kixki)
+ ξ w¯l−k(w
l
k − w¯
l
−k)(c
l −
∑
k′∈Kl
mlk′)
−
ρ¯−ki
N l − 1
∑
k′j∈N l\{ki}
αlk′j
2qlk′j′yk′j (24)
where agent k′j′ is an agent from group k′ on link l who can
be identified by the index glk′(j) − 1, if G
l
k′ ≥ 2 and ζ, η, ξ
are small enough positive constants. However if Glk′ = 1 we
would use w¯l−k′ instead of q
l
k′j′ .
Similarly for Glk = 1, we have
tlki = xkiα
l
kiw¯
l
−k + (w
l
k − w¯
l
−k)
2
+ η w¯l−k(
1qlki − w¯
l
−k)(m
l
k − α
l
kixki)
+ ξ w¯l−k(w
l
k − w¯
l
−k)(c
l −
∑
k′∈Kl
mlk′)
−
ρ¯−ki
N l − 1
∑
k′j∈N l\{ki}
αlk′j
2qlk′j′yk′j . (25)
In addition to previous definitions,
ρ¯−ki :=
1
N − 1
∑
k′j∈N\{ki}
ρk′j . (26)
Denote the corresponding game by G0. The implications of
these modifications are discussed in the results section below.
B. Results
This new mechanism will also fully implement (CP). The
only term in ûki that is affected by ρki is −(ρki − r)2,
so all the Lemmas from Section III are valid with minor
modifications and the main result will follow using the same
line of argumentation as for Theorem III.1. Note here that,
terms in ûki affected by
1qlki,
2qlki’s are the same as before
9but for yki there is a new term −(ρki − r)2 which is affected
by it.
Theorem IV.1 (Full Implementation with SBB). For game
G0, there is a unique allocation, x, corresponding to all NE.
Moreover, x = x∗, the maximizer of (CP), where individual
rationality is satisfied for all agents inN . Also, SBB is satisfied
at all NE.
For economy of exposition, in the following, we only pro-
vide detailed proofs for the new properties of this mechanism,
while we outline the proofs for the properties that are similar
to those in the WBB mechanism.
• Primal Feasibility - Since allocation function is the same as
before, this result holds here as well.
• Equal Prices at equilibrium - This was proved by taking
price deviations only and keeping other parameters of the
signal constant, so the same argument works here as well
(noting that no new price related terms have been added in
the new mechanism).
Before moving on to other results, we show that a common
ρki’s emerges at equilibrium.
Lemma IV.2. At any NE s = (y, P, ρ) of game G0, we have
ρki = r ∀ ki ∈ N .
Proof. Please see Appendix G.
Note however that although ρki are same for all ki at any
equilibrium, that common value, r, will be different across
equilibria. This is obvious since magnitude of vector y changes
across equilibria.
Now we continue with other properties from Section III.
• Dual Feasibility - This is obvious here as well.
• Complimentary Slackness - This was proved by taking only
price deviations and hence the same argument works here
as well.
• Stationarity - Compared to the WBB case, the additional
term in the derivative is
∂ûki
∂y′ki
∣∣∣
new
=
∂ûki
∂y′ki
∣∣∣
old︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
− 2ζ(ρ′ki − r
′)
(
−
∂r′
∂y′ki
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
(27)
The claim is, as before, that if T1 is positive, agent ki can
increase y′ki from yki to be better-off. However agent ki
has to ensure that he deviates with ρ′ki simultaneously to
make it equal to r′, so that the contribution of the T2 term
to the derivative above continues to be zero. The only thing
left to notice here is that the change in ρ′ki is such that not
only the term T2 is zero but also that the contribution of term
−ζ(ρ′ki−r
′)2 to the utility is zero before and after deviation
- so this deviation doesn’t change other partial derivatives.
Similar argument also works when T1 is negative and we
get the stationarity property here as well.
With the above properties, unique allocation x∗ at all equilibria
is guaranteed, and, as before, the prices are equal to λ∗.
Existence of equilibria is verified in Appendix H. The argu-
ments used are similar to the ones in the proof of Lemma III.7.
• Individual Rationality - This is obvious in here because
money from the previous case is only being redistributed
here, so if the mechanism there was individually rational it
will be here too.
Lemma IV.3 (Strong Budget Balance). At any NE s =
(y, P, ρ) of game G0, with corresponding taxes {tki}ki∈N , we
have
∑
ki∈N tki = 0.
Proof. Please see Appendix I.
Proof of Theorem IV.1. By the preceding properties, at all
equilibria the allocation is x∗ and prices λ∗. Then SBB
and individual rationality provide the desired full implementa-
tion.
V. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we present a mechanism that fully implements
the sum of utilities maximizing allocation for agents who share
data on a multicast/multirate network. The scope of application
of this model goes beyond just data provision on networks.
Another example (as mentioned in the Introduction) is the
provision of security products for server farms. The design
also encompasses two important auxiliary properties: off-
equilibrium feasibility of allocation (using the radial projection
function) and SBB at NE. In addition the overall size of the
message space is linear in the number of agents, N .
The work in [18] is similar to the work in this paper
except for two things. Firstly, the mechanism doesn’t posses
the off-equilibrium feasibility property and secondly there are
instances of the centralized problem where the claimed NE
profiles do indeed have profitable unilateral deviations, thereby
contradicting the full implementation claim.
In the spirit of some recent works [27], [28] for Walrasian
and Lindahl allocations, the main continuation of this work
would be to design the allocation/tax functions where in
addition to full implementation, convergence of certain classes
of learning algorithms is also taken as a design objective.
This way we can convert our “learning ready” mechanism
into a guaranteed learning mechanism. Designing so that the
ensuing game is a potential game or a super-modular game is
too stringent for this problem. But the design technique used
in [28], namely contractive best response correspondence, is
slightly relaxed. Basic design parameters like the structure of
the message space (consisting of demands and prices) can be
kept the same in this case.
Another future direction, from an engineering perspective,
can be to impose additional constraints on the mechanism
design so that the messages in the resulting mechanism can be
exchanged in a distributed manner and can possibly eliminate
the need for a centralized coordinator to collect all quoted
message and impose allocation and taxes. Naturally, such a
development would require the assumption that even without
the presence of a centralized coordinator agents will pay the
taxes that the mechanism contract requires and that allocation
(as defined by the mechanism) can be effected.
For the mechanism defined in this paper the communication
structure is as follows. The prices 1qlki,
2qlki can be communi-
cated only locally within group k and link l. The quantity w¯l−k
requires communication between groups and for this a leader
can be designated from each group, who will communicate
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with the other leaders. Calculating the allocation poses other
issues. The leader of group k on link l can also calculate
nlk = maxi∈Glk{α
l
kiyki} and communicate it with other groups
on link l to calculate rl and then communication is needed
across links to get r = minl∈L r
l.
Acknowledgment: Authors would like to thank the anony-
mous reviewers of this paper for their reviews and suggestions
for possible future research direcitons.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA III.2
Proof. Constraint C1 is clearly always satisfied. For y = 0 we
have x = 0 and m = 0, so constraints C2 and C3 are also
clearly satisfied. Next we show C2 and C3 are satisfied for any
y 6= 0 as demand. Firstly r < +∞, since there exists at least
one link d with |Sd(y)| ≥ 1 and thus rd < +∞. Now, for
any link l, there are the following two cases. If |Sl(y)| = 0,
then the allocation for all agents in N l is zero (along with the
correspondingmlk’s), so C2 and C3 for those links is satisfied.
If |Sl(y)| ≥ 1 then∑
k∈Kl
mlk = r
∑
k∈Kl
nlk ≤ r
l
∑
k∈Kl
nlk ≤
cl∑
k∈Kl n
l
k
∑
k∈Kl
nlk = c
l
(28)
where the first inequality holds because r is the minimum of
all rl’s. The second inequality is equality if |Sl(y)| ≥ 2 and
is strict only if |Sl(y)| = 1 (see second sub-case in (9c)). For
C2, take any agent ki and link l ∈ Lki
αlkixki = rα
l
kiyki ≤ rn
l
k = m
l
k (29)
where the inequality holds because nlk is the maximum over
αlkiyki’s for all i ∈ G
l
k.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA III.3
Proof. First we show the second part of the lemma, so suppose
there are agents i, e ∈ Glk as above, for whom
2qlki 6=
1qlke.
If agent ki deviates with 2qlki
′
= 1qlke then we can write the
difference in agent ki’s utility after and before deviation by
just comparing tax for link l (since allocation and tax for other
links don’t change)
∆ûki = −(
2qlki
′
− 1qlke)
2 + (2qlki −
1qlke)
2
= (2qlki −
1qlke)
2 > 0 (30)
which means that the deviation was profitable. This gives us
the second part of the lemma. (In addition to defining 2qlki =
1qlke = p
l
ke when G
l
k ≥ 2, we will also denote
1qlki = w
l
k =
plki when G
l
k = {i}).
For the first part, suppose there is a link l for which
(wlk)k∈Kl are not all equal, at equilibrium. Clearly then there
is a group k ∈ Kl for which wlk > w¯
l
−k (this can be
seen from (11)). We will show that some agent i ∈ Glk can
deviate by reducing price 1qlki and be strictly better off, thereby
contradicting the equilibrium condition. First we take the case
when the group k is such that Glk ≥ 2 and then G
l
k = 1.
Since wlk > w¯
l
−k we must have w
l
k > 0 and since w
l
k =∑
i∈Gl
k
1qlki there must be an agent i ∈ G
l
k for whom
1qlki > 0.
Take deviation by this agent ki as 1qlki
′
= 1qlki − ǫ > 0, for
which we can write the difference in utility, just as before, as
∆ûki = −ǫ
2 + 2ǫ(wlk − w¯
l
−k) + η ǫp
l
ki(m
l
k − α
l
kixki)
+ ξ ǫw¯l−k(c
l −
∑
k∈Kl
mlk)
= ǫ
(
− ǫ+ 2(wlk − w¯
l
−k) + η p
l
ki(m
l
k − α
l
kixki)
+ ξ w¯l−k(c
l −
∑
k∈Kl
mlk)
)
= ǫ(−ǫ+ a) (31)
where a > 0 because of Lemma III.2 and the fact that wlk >
w¯l−k. So by taking ǫ such that min {a,
1qlki} > ǫ > 0, the
above deviation will be a profitable one for agent ki. This
gives the result for Glk ≥ 2.
For Glk = 1, say G
l
k = {i}, we have that
1qlki = w
l
k > w¯
l
−k.
This again means that 1qlki > 0 and we take the deviation
1qlki
′
= 1qlki − ǫ > 0 and get
∆ûki = ǫ
(
− ǫ+ 2(wlk − w¯
l
−k) + η w¯
l
−k(m
l
k − α
l
kixki)
+ ξ w¯l−k(c
l −
∑
k∈Kl
mlk)
)
. (32)
Following the same argument as above we will get our result
here as well.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA III.5
Proof. Suppose there is a link l for which wl > 0 and∑
k∈Kl m
l
k < c
l. Take any group k ∈ Kl and an agent
i ∈ Glk such that
1qlki = p
l
ki > 0 (there is such an
agent because wl =
∑
i∈Gl
k
1qlki > 0). Take the deviation
1qlki
′
= 1qlk,i− ǫ > 0 and we get (using same arguments as in
(31) and noting that wlk = w¯
l
−k = w
l)
∆ûki = ǫ
(
−ǫ+η plki(m
l
k − α
l
kixki)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 by Lemma III.2
+ξ wl(cl−
∑
k∈Kl
mlk)
)
= ǫ(−ǫ+ a). (33)
where a > 0 due to Lemma III.2 and the assumption
that wl(cl −
∑
k∈Kl m
l
k) > 0. This gives us that w
l(cl −∑
k∈Kl m
l
k) = 0 for all l ∈ L at equilibrium.
Now suppose there is an agent ki for whom 1qlki = p
l
ki > 0
and αlkixki < m
l
k. Same as before, we take the deviation
1qlki
′
= 1qlki − ǫ > 0,
∆ûki = ǫ
(
−ǫ+ η plki(m
l
k − α
l
kixki)
)
= ǫ(−ǫ+ a) (34)
where a > 0 by assumption. This gives us that plki(m
l
k −
αlkixki) = 0 for all ki ∈ N
l and l ∈ L, at equilibrium.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA III.6
Proof. (18) is true by construction since we defined wlk =∑
i∈Gl
k
plki and by Lemma III.3 we have p
l
ki =
1qlki and w
l
k =
wl.
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At any NE, agent ki’s utility in the game ûki(s
′) =
vki(h
x
ki(s
′)) − htki(s
′) as a function of his message s′ki =
(y′ki, Q
′
ki), with s−ki fixed, should have a global maximum at
ski = (yki, Pki). This would mean that if this function was
differentiable w.r.t. y′ki at s, the partial derivatives w.r.t. y
′
ki
at s should be 0. However, since our allocation dilates/shrinks
demand vector y′ on to the feasible region, it could be the case
that increasing and decreasing y′ki gives allocations lying on
different hyperplanes, meaning that the transformation from y′
to x′ is different on both sides of yki and therefore we conclude
that ûki could be non-differentiable w.r.t y
′
ki at s. Important
thing here however is to notice that right and left derivatives
exist, it’s just that they may not be equal. Hence we can take
derivatives on both sides of yki as (noting that derivative of
the other terms in utility involving xki or involving m
l
k will
be zero due Lemma III.3)
∂ûki
∂yki
′∣∣∣
y′
ki
↓yki
=
(
v′ki(xki)−
∑
l∈Lki
plkiα
l
ki
)
∂x′ki
∂y′ki
∣∣∣
y′
ki
↓yki
(35a)
∂ûki
∂yki
′∣∣∣
y′
ki
↑yki
=
(
v′ki(xki)−
∑
l∈Lki
plkiα
l
ki
)
∂x′ki
∂y′ki
∣∣∣
y′
ki
↑yki
(35b)
We will first show that the ∂xki/∂yki term above (for either
equation) is always positive. If y = 0 then clearly this is true,
because if any agent ki demands yki > ǫ while y−ki = 0
then clearly xki > 0 (in fact the allocation is differentiable at
y = 0). If y 6= 0 from (10a), we can write
β :=
∂xki
∂yki
=
∂(ryki)
∂yki
= r + yki
∂r
∂yki
= rq + yki
∂rq
∂yki
(36)
where r = rq .
From here we divide our arguments into following
cases: (A) ki /∈ N q (⇔ i /∈ Gqk); (B) ki ∈ N
q ,
i /∈ argmaxj∈Gq
k
{αqkjykj} and (C) ki ∈ N
q , i ∈
argmaxj∈Gq
k
{αqkjykj}.
(A) For this clearly ∂rq/∂yki = 0 and this makes β = r
q >
0.
(B) Since value of rq depends only on the value of
(nqk)k∈Kq , and in this case changes in yki don’t affect n
q
k we
can see that ∂rq/∂yki = 0 and so β = r
q > 0.
(C) We divide this case into two cases: |Sq(y)| ≥ 2 or
|Sq(y)| = 1. If |Sq(y)| ≥ 2 then
β = rq + yki
∂rq
∂yki
= rq + yki
(
−
cq
(
∑
k0∈Kq
nqk0)
2
)
∂nqk
∂yki
.
(37)
Now
∂n
q
k
∂yki
is either αqki or 0. If it is 0 then β = r
q > 0.
Otherwise we have
β =
(rq)2
cq
∑
k0∈Kq\{k}
nqk0 (38)
which is positive because |Sq(y)| ≥ 2, since then there is at
least one positive term in the summation. For |Sq(y)| = 1, we
will consider Sq(y) = {k}; else in case Sq(y) = {k0} 6= {k},
taking the derivative would give the same expression as above.
For Sq(y) = {k} we will get
rq =
cq
nqk
−
cq
nqk(n
q
k + 1)
=
cq
nqk
(
1−
1
nqk + 1
)
=
cq
nqk + 1
(39a)
β = rq + yki
∂rq
∂nqk
∂nqk
∂yki
(39b)
where
∂n
q
k
∂yki
is either 0 or αqki. If it is 0 then β = r
q > 0 and
if it is αqki then we have β =
(rq)2
cq
. Hence we have β > 0 in
all cases.
Referring to (35), there are two possibilities, the first term
on RHS in both equations in (35) is positive or negative. If
it’s positive, then we can see from (35a) that by increasing y′ki
from yki (and therefore x
′
ki from xki) agent ki can increase his
pay-off, which contradicts equilibrium. Now similarly consider
the first term in RHS of (35) to be negative, then from (35b),
agent ki can reduce y′ki from yki to get a better pay-off. But
the downward deviation in y′ki is only possible if yki > 0
(⇔ xki > 0). Hence we conclude (17a), (17b) from the
statement of this lemma.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA III.7
Proof. We will show that s = (y,Q) is a NE of the game G,
where for each agent ki ∈ N , yki = ρx
∗
ki (for any ρ > 0) and
1qlki = µ
l
ki
∗
and 2qlki = µ
l
ke
∗
, (40)
where agent ke is the one identified by index glk(i) + 1.
Here x∗, µ∗ are the primal-dual variables that satisfy the KKT
conditions of (CP).
Define the function f : Ski → R as follows
f(s′ki) , ûki(s
′
ki, s−ki) (41a)
= vki
(
hxki(s
′
ki, s−ki)
)
− htki(s
′
ki, s−ki). (41b)
The above claim will be shown in two steps: In Step 1 we
show that message s results in allocation x∗ and additionally
we have ∇f(ski) = 0. In Step 2 we show that for any agent
ki, unilateral deviations from ski are not strictly profitable.
Step 1. Assumption (A4) implies that with y = ρx∗, while
calculating allocation
(
hxki(s)
)
ki∈N
, sub-case 1 in eq. (9c) will
be valid. This is turn implies that hx(s) = x∗. Thus, message
y = ρx∗ produces allocation x∗. Now, using the complimen-
tary slackness property of KKT and the fact that in the claimed
NE above, we have for any ki ∈ N , 2qlki =
1qlke = µ
l
ke
∗
, it
can be easily shown that the partial derivative of f w.r.t. 1qlki
evaluated at the point ski is zero and the same is true for
the partial derivative w.r.t 2qlki. Finally using the stationarity
condition in KKT we deduce that the partial derivative of f
w.r.t. yki evaluated at the point ski is zero. Thus, ∇f(ski) = 0.
Step 2. We now check for profitable deviations. This task
is accomplished in two steps. In Step 2a, we show that any
interior local extrema s˜ki =
(
y˜ki,
1q˜lki,
2q˜lki
)
of f(·) satisfies
∇f(s˜ki) = 0. Furthermore, we show that any interior local
extrema s˜ki produces allocation h
x(s˜ki, s−ki) and prices that
satisfy the KKT conditions as x∗, µ∗. In Step 2b, using Step 2a,
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we show that all interior local extrema are local maxima. As
a result of this and using the fact that by construction, f(s′ki)
is continuous w.r.t. s′ki, we conclude that f(·) can have only
a single local maximum and this is also the global maximum.
This is because all local extrema are necessarily characterized
by ∇f(s˜ki) = 0 (Step 2a) and there cannot be multiple local
maxima in the interior without a local minima between them.
Furthermore, using this argument we know that this global
maximizer has to be in the interior. Finally, using the fact
that ∇f(ski) = 0 (Step 1) we conclude that this maximizer
is ski. In other words, agent ki cannot be strictly better off
by unilaterally deviating from ski. As this is checked for any
agent ki ∈ N , we conclude that above mentioned message
s = (y,Q) is a NE.
Step 2a. First we will show that without the gradient being
zero, there cannot be a local extremum. Note that by construc-
tion, f(s′ki) is continuous w.r.t. s
′
ki. Since f(·) is differentiable
w.r.t. 1qlki,
2qlki variables (at all points), derivatives w.r.t. these
indeed have to be 0 at any interior local extremum. This
implies equal prices and complimentary slackness properties
(using arguments from respective proofs) and for the remaining
term we can write
∂f
∂yki
=
(
v′ki(xki)−
∑
l∈Lki
αlkip
l
ki
)(
∂xki
∂yki
)
. (42)
Note that in the proof of Lemma III.6, we have shown
that β := ∂xki
∂yki
> 0 always. So at the points of non-
differentiability, β will have a jump discontinuity, however
it will be positive on either side. It is then clear that without
satisfying v′ki(xki) =
∑
l∈Lki
αlkip
l
ki, there cannot be a local
extremum. This implies that ∇f(s˜ki) = 0 at any interior local
extremum. Furthermore, KKT conditions must be satisfied at
the corresponding allocation hx(s˜ki, s−ki) and prices µ
∗, λ∗.
For this note that 1q˜lki =
2qlkj (where kj is the agent with
index glk(i) − 1) and from (40) we know that
2qlkj = µ
l
ki
∗
.
Thus 1q˜lki = µ
l
ki
∗
and similarly 2q˜lki = µ
l
ke
∗
(where ke
is the agent with index glk(i) + 1). This combined with
v′ki(xki) =
∑
l∈Lki
αlkip
l
ki from above, implies that KKT is
satisfied at the local extrema.
Step 2b. The Hessian H of f(·) w.r.t. s′ki is of size
(2Lki + 1) × (2Lki + 1), where the 1st row and column
represent y′ki and the two subsequent sets of Lki rows and
columns represent {1qlki
′
}l∈Lki and {
2qlki
′
}l∈Lki . We want
H (evaluated at any local extremum) to be negative definite.
Looking at the diagonal entries, and using what we have
derived in the previous paragraph, it can be calculated that
the only non-zero entries at any local extrema are negative
f1q1q :=
∂2f
∂1ql
ki
∂1ql
ki
= −2, f2q2q :=
∂2f
∂2ql
ki
∂2ql
ki
= −2,
fyy :=
∂2f
∂y2
ki
= v′′ki(xki)
(
∂xki
∂yki
)2
(due to strict concavity of
vki). Also notice that all off-diagonal entries, except the first
Lki+1 in the first row and column, are zero. Finally, note that
due to assumption (A2), all prices are finite at local extremum
and so the aforementioned non-zero entries
f1qy :=
∂2f
∂1qlki∂yki
= η 2qlkj
(
αlki
∂xki
∂yki
−
∂mlk
∂yki
)
+ ξ w¯l−k
 ∑
k′∈Kl
∂mlk′
∂yki
 (43)
are finite. We now show that the roots of the characteristic
polynomial of H (i.e. its eigenvalues) all become negative for
η, ξ chosen to be sufficiently small.
For this, we take a generic matrix A0, which is similar in
structure to H and whose entries have the same dependence
on |y| as H . So A0 is of the form A0 =
[
A 0
0 D
]
where
D = (−2)ILki . In this case we know that eigenvalues of A
and D together will give us all the eigenvalues of A0. Clearly
eigenvalues ofD are −2 repeated Lki times, so all that we now
need to do is check whether all eigenvalues of A are negative.
Entries in A are a11 = −
a
|y|2 , aij = aji = 0 ∀ i, j > 1, i 6= j
and aii = −2, a1i = ai1 = η
bi−1
|y| ∀ 2 ≤ i ≤ Lki + 1. where
a > 0 (and we don’t care about the sign of bi’s). The factor
of η in front of ai1, a1i is to be taken as max (η, ξ), but since
we can set either of them we take it simply as η here. The
parameters a, bi may not be completely independent of y but
since the absolute value of y has been taken out of the scaling,
their values are bounded. Magnitude of bi’s are bounded from
above and a is bounded away from zero.
We can explicitly calculate |A − λI| and write the charac-
teristic equation as
Q(λ) =
(
−
a
|y|2
− λ
)
(−2− λ)Lki
+ η2
∑Lki
i=1(−1)
ib2i
|y|2
(−2− λ)Lki−1 = 0. (44)
So −2 is a repeated eigenvalue, Lki − 1 times. The equation
for the remaining two roots can be written as(
−
a
|y|2
− λ
)
(−2− λ) + η2
C
|y|2
= 0. (45)
Necessary and sufficient conditions for both roots of this
quadratic to be negative are(
2 +
a
|y|2
)
> 0,
2a
|y|2
+ η2
C
|y|2
> 0, (46)
the first of which is always true, since a > 0. The second
one can be ensured by making η small enough, since a is
bounded away from zero and the magnitude of C is bounded
from above.
Hence the Hessian H is shown to be negative definite for
η chosen to be small enough.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA III.8
Proof. Because of Lemma III.3, the only non-zero term in tki
(see (12)) at equilibrium is xki
∑
l∈Lki
αlkip
l
ki, which is clearly
non-negative. Hence
∑
ki∈N tki ≥ 0 at equilibrium.
Now if xki = 0 then we know from Lemma III.3 and (12)
that tki = 0 and so (19) is evident. Now take xki > 0 and
define the function
f(z) = vki(z)− z
∑
l∈Lki
αlkip
l
ki. (47)
13
Note that f(0) = uki(0, 0) and f(xki) = uki(x, t), the utility
at equilibrium. Since f ′(xki) = 0 (Lemma III.6), we see that
∀ 0 < y < xki, f ′(y) > 0 since f strictly concave (because
of vki). This clearly implies f(xki) ≥ f(0).
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF LEMMA IV.2
Proof. Suppose not, i.e. assume ∃ kj ∈ N such that ρkj 6= r.
In this case agent kj can deviate with only changing ρ′kj = r
(which also means r is the same as before deviation, since
demand y doesn’t change). It’s easy to see that this is a
profitable deviation, since change in utility of agent kj will
be only through the term involving ρkj .
∆ûkj = −ζ(ρ
′
kj−r)
2+ζ(ρkj−r)
2 = ζ(ρkj−r)
2 > 0. (48)
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF EXISTENCE IN SECTION IV
Proof. First order conditions can again be shown to be satis-
fied, the only difference is that here we will also use ρki = r at
local extremum. The Hessian H for any agent ki here will be
of order (2Lki+2)×(2Lki+2) where 1st, 2nd row and column
represent yki, ρki respectively whereas the remaining rows
and columns represent 1qlki’s and
2qlki’s. The generic matrix
A0 for H will then be of the form A0 =
[
A 0
0 D
]
where
D = (−2)ILki and matrix A, of order (Lki + 2)× (Lki + 2),
has elements a11 = −
a
|y|2 − ζ
d
|y|4 , a12 = a21 = −ζ
e
|y|2 ,
aij = aji = 0 ∀ i, j > 1, i 6= j, a22 = −2, aii = −2, and
a1i = ai1 = η
bi−1
|y| ∀ 3 ≤ i ≤ Lki + 2. where a, d, e > 0. As
before, it will be shown that all eigenvalues of A are negative
(since that is clearly true for D). Writing the characteristic
equation, it is the case again that −2 is a repeated eigenvalue,
Lki times. And the equation for remaining two roots is
λ2 + λ
(
2 +
a
|y|2
+ ζ
d
|y|4
)
+
(
2a
|y|2
+ ζ
2d
|y|4
− ζ2
E
|y|4
+ η2
C
|y|2
)
= 0 (49)
Necessary and sufficient conditions for the roots of above
quadratic to be negative are again that coefficient of λ and
the constant term are both positive. Coefficient of λ is clearly
positive, and the constant term can also be made positive
by choosing ζ, η (& ξ) small enough, irrespective of sign of
C.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF LEMMA IV.3
Proof. Terms 2, 3, 4 and 5 in (24) and (25) are zero at
equilibrium and so we can write (at equilibrium)
∑
ki∈N
tki =
∑
ki∈N
xki
(∑
l∈Lki
αlkip
l
ki
)
− r
∑
l∈Lki
1
N l − 1
∑
k′j′∈N l\{ki}
αlk′j′p
l
k′j′yk′j′
=
∑
ki∈N
∑
l∈Lki
xkiαlkiplki − 1N l − 1 ∑
k′j′∈N l\{ki}
αlk′j′p
l
k′j′xk′j′
 .
(50)
The coefficient of xki for any agent ki in the above is
∑
l∈Lki
αlkiplki − 1N l − 1 ∑
k′j′∈N l\{ki}
αlkip
l
ki
 = 0 (51)
which proves the claim.
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